

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

GERONIMO F. ROSADO, Jr.,
Plaintiff,

v.

PSP. STATE TROOPER
BARRACKS, *et al.*,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-CV-5068

ORDER

AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 2020, upon consideration of Plaintiff Geronimo F. Rosado's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6), it is **ORDERED** that:

1. Defendants PSP Coatesville State Trooper Barracks and PA State Department of Motor Vehicles are **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to **TERMINATE** PSP Coatesville State Trooper Barracks and PA State Department of Motor Vehicles as Defendants.

3. The balance of the Amended Complaint is **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE** pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for the reasons in the Court's Memorandum. Rosado may file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order following the guidelines set forth in the Court's accompanying Memorandum. If Rosado fails to follow the Court's guidelines, any further dismissal of any claim or dismissal of any Defendant for failure to comply with Rule 8, may be with prejudice. Upon the filing of a second amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so **ORDERED** by the Court.

4. The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to send Rosado a blank copy of this Court's current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil

action bearing the above-captioned civil action number. Rosado may use this form to file his second amended complaint if he chooses to do so.

5. If Rosado does not wish to amend and instead intends to stand on his Amended Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Amended Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. *See Weber v. McGrogan*, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting *Borelli v. City of Reading*, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); *In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig.*, 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).

6. If Rosado fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Rosado intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.¹ *See Weber*, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent

¹ The six-factor test announced in *Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.*, 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on his complaint. *See Weber*, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the *Poulis* factors); *see also Elansari v. Altria*, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under *Poulis* is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes

to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.

adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. *See Dickens v. Danberg*, 700 F. App'x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the *Poulis* factors is not necessary.”); *Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc.*, 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six *Poulis* factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).